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This report describes an outbreak investigation start-
ing with two closely related suspected food-borne clus-
ters of Dutch hepatitis A cases, nine primary cases in 
total, with an unknown source in the Netherlands. The 
hepatitis A virus (HAV) genotype IA sequences of both 
clusters were highly similar (459/460 nt) and were not 
reported earlier. Food questionnaires and a case–con-
trol study revealed an association with consumption of 
mussels. Analysis of mussel supply chains identified 
the most likely production area. International enquir-
ies led to identification of a cluster of patients near 
this production area with identical HAV sequences 
with onsets predating the first Dutch cluster of cases. 
The most likely source for this cluster was a case who 
returned from an endemic area in Central America, and 
a subsequent household cluster from which treated 
domestic sewage was discharged into the suspected 
mussel production area. Notably, mussels from this 
area were also consumed by a separate case in the 
United Kingdom sharing an identical strain with the 
second Dutch cluster. In conclusion, a small number of 
patients in a non-endemic area led to geographically 
dispersed hepatitis A outbreaks with food as vehicle. 
This link would have gone unnoticed without sequence 
analyses and international collaboration.
Introduction
Hepatitis A virus (HAV) is a faecal-orally transmitted 
pathogen causing acute self-limiting hepatitis. Risk fac-
tors for infection include exposure to infected persons, 
contact with faecally contaminated surfaces, food or 
water. The incidence of hepatitis A in industrialised 
countries has decreased due to improved sanitary and 
living conditions. The decreasing immunity in younger 
age groups has led to increasing age and severity of 
first infection [1]. Hepatitis A could therefore re-emerge 
in regions such as North America or western Europe, 
where it is not endemic, affecting mostly adults, with 
more severe course of infection [1]. In the Netherlands 
the incidence rate for hepatitis A in 2010 was 1.3 cases 
per 100,000 population [2]. Hepatitis A is a notifiable 
disease in the Netherlands. Cases, including routine 
demographic and epidemiological data, are reported 
according to standardised national criteria [3] by 
regional public health services using Osiris, a national 
electronic registration system for infectious diseases 
hosted by the National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment (RIVM). Surveillance is intensi-
fied for cases with no travel history to endemic coun-
tries and an unknown source of infection. For these 
cases, sequences are actively collected and additional 
hypothesis-generating (trawler) questionnaires are 
routinely administered, aiming to identify a potential 
common (food-borne) source of infection [2-4].
Recently, food-borne transmission of HAV has been 
implicated in several multinational outbreaks or involv-
ing multiple states in the United States (US), occurring 
in rapid succession in 2013 and 2014 [5-8]. Such dif-
fuse outbreaks that are characterised by cases that are 
geographically or temporally dispersed benefit from 
combining epidemiological data with viral sequence 
data. Finding the source is challenging due to the long 
incubation period of two to six weeks [9]. Recall can 
be assisted by the use of structured questionnaires 
including known risk factors or risk products [3,4]. 
Absolute confirmation of a food source is rare, in part 
due to difficulties with detection of the viral RNA in 
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food or the absence of leftovers, while international 
traceback of food can be complex [8]. The high num-
bers of notifications in the Rapid Alert System for Food 
and Feed (RASFF) Portal website related to the pres-
ence of norovirus or hepatitis A virus in food in 2013 
and 2014 compared with previous years indicate an 
increased awareness of the importance of food-borne 
viruses.
In this study we describe a thorough outbreak inves-
tigation by multiple institutes in two European Union 
(EU) Member States that yielded evidence for a com-
mon source of infection for nine Dutch hepatitis A 
patients and one patient in the United Kingdom (UK). 
The investigation was initiated after identification of 
a cluster consisting of four seemingly unrelated Dutch 
hepatitis A cases with an identical but unique HAV 
sequence (genotype IA) in August 2012. In November 
2012, another cluster of seemingly unrelated hepatitis 
A cases, again with an identical HAV IA sequence, was 
identified. The HAV IA sequence of the second cluster 
was closely related (459/460 nt similarity) to the strain 
that caused the first cluster. The source was assumed 
to be food-borne, as hepatitis A is not endemic in 
the Netherlands, there was no known direct contact 
between the cases, and detailed case histories were 
negative for other common risk factors of hepatitis A. 
The onset of illness in each cluster occurred within a 
short period of two weeks with no recognised cases in 
the two to three month period in between these clus-
ters. The final linkage between the Dutch and UK cases 
could only be conclusively made after combining trace-
back results of the suspected food items for each of 
the clusters and information provided by international 
partners.
Methods
Active case finding by laboratory surveillance 
network
For cases with no travel history to endemic countries 
and an unknown source, additional routine hypothe-
sis-generating questionnaires were administered. This 
questionnaire addresses a broad list of over 70 food 
products, 15 occupations and six health conditions, 
and is available upon request [3,4]. IgM positive sera 
or faecal samples from ca 70% of confirmed hepatitis 
A cases are sent by diagnostic laboratories to RIVM 
Figure 1
Flowchart of available case data from different sources of information, food-borne hepatitis A clusters, the Netherlands, 
2012
Patient sera submitted for genotyping
1 Aug 2012 to 18 Feb 2013
N=96
Hepatitis A notifications
1 Aug 2012 to 18 Feb 2013
N=89
Food questionnaires of HAV patients
received from 1 Aug 2012 to 18 Feb 2013
 N=14
Patient sera matched 
to notified patients
N=79 
Patients without food 
information in Osiris
N=64
Patients with  food 
information in Osiris
N=25 
Patients with unknown source 
in the Netherlands and food 
info after active follow-up
N=21
Patients with unknown source 
in the Netherlands and IA genotype 
N=13
Patients with unknown 
source in the Netherlands
N=24 
Cluster cases with 
sequence 12-070 or 12-124
N=9
Unrelated cases
i.e. with other sequences
N=6 
Cluster cases with food info 
in Osiris and food questionnaires
N=9
Unrelated cases with
food info in Osiris
N=4
Unrelated cases with
food questionnaires
N=2
HAV: hepatitis A virus.
Osiris is the electronic registration system for infectious diseases hosted by the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment.
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for genotyping [3]. Subsequently, a 460 nt fragment of 
the VP1/2A region [10,11] is compared with sequences 
recorded in an international HAV sequence database 
of HAVNET and GenBank. HAVNET is a global network 
of scientists working in hepatitis A reference laborato-
ries. The network shares molecular and epidemiologi-
cal data on hepatitis A.
Case definition hepatitis A cases in the Netherlands 
registered between 1 August 2012 and 18 February 2013 
with an unknown source in the Netherlands were clas-
sified as follows: (i) summer cluster cases were cases 
infected by HAV strain RIVM-HAV12–070; (ii) autumn 
cluster cases were cases infected by HAV strain RIVM-
HAV12–124; (iii) unrelated cases were unvaccinated 
persons infected by a HAV strain dissimilar from RIVM-
HAV12–070 and RIVM -HAV12–124 with difference of at 
least 7/460 nt; (iv) Other cases: cases for which no HAV 
sequence is available (not included in the analysis).
Statistical analyses of risk factors from 
questionnaire data
The food items addressed in the hypothesis-generating 
food questionnaire or in the Osiris system were trans-
formed to binary variables, i.e. consumed two to six 
weeks before disease onset vs not consumed or con-
sumed longer ago than six weeks before disease onset. 
Using a univariate logistic regression model (SAS ver-
sion 9.3, SAS Institute Inc, USA) outcomes for HAV-
cluster-cases were compared with unrelated cases. 
The significance of the identified food items was fur-
ther investigated using data on consumption patterns 
in healthy people unrelated to any outbreak [12]. For 
this, data were collected in the flexible Dutch popula-
tion control group over a four-year period from 2008 to 
2011 (n = 1,402).
Traceback investigation
Fresh mussel suppliers to specific supermarket chains, 
as derived from questionnaire data, were identified 
as well as the harvesting areas of mussels potentially 
involved, and the shipping dates to the Netherlands, 
when applicable. Information on shipments was 
requested from the Dutch Fish Product Board for the 
period six weeks before disease onset in the first 
patient until two weeks before disease onset in the last 
patient for both clusters. The registration documents 
of the mussel consignments revealed the number of 
batches, harvesting areas and countries for each sup-
plier during these two periods.
International enquiry
Enquiries for any information on possible matches with 
the unique patient sequences were sent out to interna-
tional contact points within the HAV reference labora-
tory network (HAVNET sent out enquiries on 15 January 
2013 and 7 June 2013) and the international network 
Epidemic Intelligence Information System of Food and 
Waterborne Diseases (EPIS-FWD, 15 January 2013 and 
13 December 2013) of the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC). Additional enquiries for 
any information on possible matches with the unique 
patient sequences or on any information on HAV moni-
toring in shellfish were sent out to national contact 
points (3 June 2013 and 31 October 2013) and shellfish 
reference laboratories (26 February 2013) in countries 
identified to be possibly involved. Furthermore, the 
RASFF portal database was checked for HAV notifica-
tions in 2012.
Results
Descriptive epidemiology
From 1 August 2012 to 18 February 2013, 89 hepatitis 
A cases were reported to the RIVM (Figure 1). Of these, 
24 cases acquired their infection from an unknown 
source in the Netherlands as no travel history had 
been reported. The remaining 65 cases were reported 
with travel history to endemic regions, or with an epi-
demiological link to a confirmed case with recent travel 
history to an endemic region. In the same period, the 
RIVM received 79 samples from notified cases for typ-
ing. In total, 62 strains could be successfully typed, 
and 15 of these were from hepatitis A cases with an 
unknown infection source within the Netherlands. 
These 15 cases diverged into the summer and autumn 
clusters, each with an identical sequence which was 
further investigated in this study, and six unrelated 
cases with dissimilar sequences (i.e. unrelated cases).
The summer cluster of cases infected with RIVM-
HAV12–070 consisted of three male and one female 
primary cases, with ages ranging from under 10 years 
to under 70 years of age, and onset of illness within 
10 days in August 2012. One primary case needed hos-
pitalisation. In addition, two secondary cases were 
reported, both relatives of primary cases.
Figure 2
Outcomes of traceback activities for potentially implicated 
mussels, food-borne hepatitis A clusters, the Netherlands, 
2012
Supermarket 1 Supermarket 2     Supermarket 3
3 patients 2 patients     5 patients
Supplier 1 Supplier 2     Supplier 3
30 batches 96 batches     122 batches
6 areas 8 areas     14 areas
2 countries 3 countries     4 countries
           Mussels from Area 1 and Area 2 only were common 
Summer cluster
4 primary cases
Onset of disease
Aug 2012
Autumn cluster
5 primary cases
Onset of disease
Nov 2012
Seq: RIVM-HAV12-124
Traceback period
15 Sep-30 Oct 2012
                 to both summer and autumn HAV clusters
Seq: RIVM-HAV12-070
Traceback period
16 Jun–15 Aug 2012
4 www.eurosurveillance.org
Figure 3
Timeline of disease onset with cases and relevant harvesting periods, food-borne hepatitis A clusters, the Netherlands, 2012
13 May 20 May 27 May 3 Jun 10 Jun 17 Jun 23 Jun 1 Jul 8 Jul 15 Jul 22 Jul 29 Jul 5 Aug
Week beginning
2012
12 Aug 19 Aug 26 Aug 2 Sep 9 Sep 16 Sep 23 Sep 30 Sep 7 Oct 14 Oct 21 Oct 28 Oct 4 Nov 11 Nov 18 Nov
continued
Week beginning
2012
UK case 1: adult with travel 
history to Central America 
Visits Area 2 in May 2012
Onset May 2012
RIVM-HAV12-070 (100%)
Dutch cases 1–4
Diffuse, primary cases
Onsets: Aug 2012
RIVM-HAV12-070 (100%)
Secondary cases (household)
UK case 3:  adult, notified Aug 2012
RIVM-HAV12-070 (100%)
UK case 4: child, notified Aug 2012, 
RIVM-HAV12-070 (100%)
Heavy rainfall
20 shipments in July 2012 
from harvester 1 to supplier 1
Dutch case recalled 
date of consumption of 
mussels, Oct 2012
 
UK case 5 
Mussels harvested late Sep 2012
Shipped to NL: early Oct 2012
Shipped to UK: early Oct 2012
Consumed: early Oct 2012
Dutch cases 5–9
Diffuse, primary cases
Onsets: Nov 2012
RIVM-HAV12-124 (100%)
UK case 5, adult
Onset: Nov 2012
RIVM-HAV12-124 (100%)
UK case 2: child 
Onset Jul 2012
RIVM-HAV12-070 (100%)
 
Dutch case recalled 
date of consumption of  
mussels Jul 2012
Two shipments in Sep 2012 
from harvester 1 to supplier 3
Dutch cases 5-9: traceback period 15 Sep–30 Oct 
Dutch cases 1-4: traceback period 16 Jun- 15 Aug 2012 
Food item OR (95% CI) P value Unrelated cases Cluster cases
Yes No Yes No
Food questionnaire (4 missing) (0 missing)
Mussels > 100 (0.0–999) p = 0.99 0 2 9 0
Spring onions, raw > 100 (0.0–999) p = 0.99 0 1 9 0
Onions, raw > 100 (0.0–999) p = 0.99 0 1 9 0
Prawns 8.0 (0.3–256) p = 0.24 1 1 8 1
Iceberg lettuce 8.0 (0.3–256) p = 0.24 1 1 8 1
Leafy green lettuce 7.0 (0.2–226) p = 0.27 1 1 7 1a
Osiris notification 2 missing 0 missing
Mussels > 100 (0.0–999) p = 0.99 0 4 9 0
Combined food questionnaire and Osiris 2 missing 0 missing
Mussels > 100 (0.0–999) p = 0.99 0 4 9 0
Iceberg lettuce 24.0 (1.1–519) p = 0.04 1 3 8 1
Leafy green lettuce 8.0 (0.5–139) p = 0.15 2 2 8 1
CI: confidence interval; OR: odds ratio.
Osiris is the electronic registration system for infectious diseases hosted by the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment. 
a Leafy lettuce data missing for one of the cluster cases.
Table 1
Food items consumed six weeks before the onset of disease by confirmed hepatitis A cluster (n=9) and unrelated (n=6) 
cases, the Netherlands, 2012
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The autumn cluster cases were infected with RIVM-
HAV12–124 and consisted of two male and three female 
primary cases, with ages ranging from over 40 years to 
under 70 years of age, and onset of illness within 12 
days in November 2012.
Six unrelated cases (four males and two females) 
with ages ranging between 20 and 60 years-old 
were infected by HAV strains dissimilar from RIVM-
HAV12–070 and RIVM-HAV12–124. It is assumed that 
they are primary cases, since their sequences were not 
seen in previous cases. Dates of onset of disease were 
between early August and late December 2012.
Phylogenetics and international enquiry
The RIVM-HAV12–070 and -124 were both unique in the 
international HAV sequence database of HAVNET and 
the origin of the virus could not be mapped to a spe-
cific geographic region [3, and data not shown]. Only 
four EU Member States out of 38 EPIS-FWD contact 
points responded to international enquiries reporting 
non-related cases or not to have matching sequences. 
Furthermore, three RASFF notifications on HAV were 
identified in 2012. One notification was related to mus-
sels from New Zealand that had only been distributed 
to Italy. 
Two others were related to the same batch of frozen 
strawberry cubes from China. Traceback activities to 
find a possible link to the cluster cases indicated that 
strawberries from this batch had been on the Dutch 
market partly in the same period of the incubation 
period of the patients. The strawberries had been 
used as decoration for consumer-ready packed ice 
cream sold by one of the specific supermarket chains 
identified by two of the six cases. Unfortunately, no 
sequence information for the HAV strain detected on 
the frozen sliced strawberries was available.
Risk factors from questionnaire data
From the questionnaire data available, mussels, raw 
spring onions, raw onions, prawns, iceberg lettuce and 
leafy green lettuce were recalled by at least eight of 
the nine cases as having being consumed within the 
incubation period. Univariate logistic regression anal-
yses showed clear association for mussels, prawns 
and iceberg lettuce (Table 1). All of the cluster cases 
had consumed pre-packed fresh mussels (all of which 
were heat-treated in the home before consumption), 
raw spring onions and raw onions, compared with 
none of the unrelated cases, not allowing statistical 
calculations.
In the period before the onset of illness, hepatitis A 
cluster cases were found to have consumed mussels 
significantly more often than individuals in the flex-
ible control group (Table 2). In the two to six weeks 
before the onset of illness in August and November 
2012, all nine hepatitis A cluster cases consumed mus-
sels, compared with 32 of 125 (26%) and 13 of 143 (9%) 
for control groups during the 4 weeks before August 
and November 2012, respectively. Prawns were also 
consumed more often by cluster cases i.e. 8/9 (89%) 
compared with 51/126 (40%) and 44/145 (30%) for con-
trol groups during the four weeks before August and 
November 2012, respectively. Lettuce, however, was 
consumed by over 80% of the control group through-
out all seasons (Table 2). Lettuce seemed therefore 
less likely to be the source of infection for these cases. 
Although other food items could not be excluded 
here, the known association of shellfish with HAV out-
breaks informed the initiation of mussel traceback 
investigations.
Traceback investigation
All cluster cases had bought mussels at local supermar-
kets, but no batch numbers or original package labels 
were available for traceback activities. Therefore the 
traceback was targeted at suppliers within the incuba-
tion periods of the patients. Within this period the sup-
pliers had sourced from a Dutch growing area and from 
other countries within the EU. No plausible sewage pol-
lution-related link between any of the cluster cases and 
the Dutch growing area was found, nor could an epide-
miological linkage be identified within the Netherlands 
due to uniqueness of the strains despite intensive sur-
veillance. The registration documents from the mussel 
consignments to the Netherlands revealed the number 
of batches, harvesting areas and countries for each 
supplier in these two periods (Figure 2). All the iden-
tified areas were in countries non-endemic for HAV. 
Shellfish reference laboratories in these countries 
enquired for information reported that no routine sur-
veillance for HAV in shellfish was performed. Archival 
mussel samples from July to November 2012 (n = 28), 
randomly collected by the Dutch Food and Consumer 
Month of report Mussels n/N %a
Prawns 
n/N %a
Lettuce 
n/N %a
January 2/9 (22) 4/9 (44) 8/8 (100)
February 12/82 (15) 22/81 (28) 71/86 (83)
March 14/129 (11) 36/132 (27) 116/139 (83)
April 17/108 (16) 36/113 (32) 100/116 (86)
May 0/11 (0) 6/11 (55) 10/11 (91)
June 12/201 (6) 74/202 (37) 178/208 (86)
July 13/156 (8) 37/162 (23) 154/167 (92)
Augustb 32/125 (26) 51/126 (40) 111/121 (92)
September 5/23 (22) 14/23 (61) 19/23 (83)
October 29/184 (16) 59/183 (32) 165/189 (88)
Novemberb 13/143 (9) 44/145 (30) 121/151 (80)
December 14/138 (10) 43/139 (30) 108/131 (82)
a Data missing for mussels (n=93), prawns (n=76) and lettuce 
(n=52). 
b Data reported for August and November (i.e. consumption during 
past four weeks) to be compared with data reported for cases 
during their incubation period.
Table 2
Food items consumed during past 4 weeks per calendar 
month by a flexible Dutch population control group, the 
Netherlands, June 2008–December 2011 (n=1,402)
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Product Safety Authority for microbiological assess-
ment of bivalves on the Dutch market, tested negative 
for HAV RNA using the method described in ISO/TS 
15216–2 [13].
Combining the traceback results for both clusters 
revealed that two harvesting areas, Area 1 and Area 
2, were common to both summer and autumn clusters 
(Figure 2). The dates of consignment for both areas 
were compared with a known date of mussel consump-
tion by one of the cases. As shipments of mussels from 
Area 1 only began five days after this consumption 
date, whereas mussel shipments from Area 2 predated 
this consumption date, the mussels from Area 2 were 
identified as the most likely source.
International case identification
It was reported that mussels in harvest Area 2 in the 
UK were all locally produced. Therefore, the Virus 
Reference Department of Public Health England was 
asked to check for similarities in their HAV data-
base with the RIVM-HAV12–070 or RIVM-HAV12–124 
sequences that could belong to local cases. For this, 
epidemiological and sequence data from different 
departments were combined, revealing two patients 
with identical sequences. The first patient identified, 
(Figure 3, UK case number 4) was a child of school 
age with onset of symptoms in early August 2012, 
infected with RIVM-HAV12–070 (100%), who lived at a 
distance less than 10 km from Area 2. The child was a 
household member of two other confirmed HAV cases 
infected with RIVM-HAV12–070 strain (100%): another 
child and a middle-aged adult with onsets of illness on 
in early July 2012 and early August 2012, respectively 
(Figure 3, UK cases number 2 and 3). The household 
did not report recent history of mussel consumption. 
Searching the database for earlier local cases revealed 
a new archival sample that matched 100% with RIVM-
HAV12–070 strain. This middle-aged adult (Figure 3, 
UK case number 1) had a travel history to a hepatitis 
A-endemic country in Central America while unvacci-
nated in April 2012. In May, the patient made a short 
visit to an area near the coast of Area 2, where the 
patient fell ill and was admitted to the local hospital in 
early June. Although direct contact between UK cases 
number 1 and 2 could not be demonstrated, the places 
of residence of these cases were within a few km of 
each other during the infectious period. The environ-
mental and water authorities showed that biologically 
treated sewage from the residences and the hospital 
was discharged into rivers at a fluvial distances of less 
than 10 km from the nearest boundary of the desig-
nated mussel-harvesting Area 2. All sewage treatment 
plants were reported to be functioning normally during 
the relevant periods when contamination might have 
occurred.
The other reported case (Figure 3, UK case number 5) 
matching the RIVM-HAV12–124 strain had no links to 
the identified Area 2, but reported having consumed 
mussels in a pub in London within the incubation period 
for the illness. Local food safety officers reported that 
the consumed mussels were bought by the pub from a 
UK wholesaler that had received mussels from a Dutch 
supplier. This Dutch supplier, Supplier 4, had packed 
mussels in early October 2012 that had been harvested 
from Area 2 by Harvester 1 (Table 3). Registration docu-
ments demonstrated that Dutch Suppliers 1 and 3 had 
also bought mussels from this harvester. The mussel 
beds of Harvester 1 were those located closest to the 
implicated sewage treatment plant inputs of harvest 
Area 2.
Sequence analyses for UK case 4 showed a strong sig-
nal for the RIVM-HAV12–070, but also a weak signal for 
the subspecies RIVM-HAV12–124 suggestive of a sub-
species within this patient which may subsequently 
have become the dominant strain in the autumn 
cluster of cases. Further Dutch cases and a UK case 
in autumn 2012 came after a period of heavy rainfall 
(23–25 September 2012) in Area 2. Heavy rain would 
have led to the activation of combined sewage over-
flow systems and thus the bypass of the sewage treat-
ment works and potential release of untreated sewage 
into Area 2. This rainfall occurred one week before 
delivery of mussels to Supplier 4 that were consumed 
by UK case number 5 and before delivery of mussels to 
Dutch 
supplier
Harvesting 
area
Harvesting 
company
Date of shipments 
in 2012
Number of 
batches
Number of 
associated cases
Location of 
associated cases
Month of onset of 
disease
1 Area 1 N.a. 17 Jul–9 Aug 2 3 Netherlands August 2012
2 Area 1 N.a. 18 Jul–16 Aug 13 2 Netherlands August 2012
3 Area 1 N.a. 25 Sep–29 Oct 17 3 Netherlands November 2012
1 Area 2 Harvester 1 2 Jul–20 Jul 20 3a Netherlands August 2012
2 Area 2 Harvester 2 21 Jun–8 Aug 32 2a Netherlands August 2012
3 Area 2 Harvester 1 17 Sep–30 Sep 2 5 Netherlands November 2012
4 Area 2 Harvester 1 29 Sep 1 1 United Kingdom November 2012
N.a.: not applicable.
a One of these patients consumed mussels from either Supplier 1 or 2.
Table 3
Linking mussels consumed by patients to a specific harvester, food-borne hepatitis A clusters, the Netherlands, 2012
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Supplier 3 consumed by at least four of the five Dutch 
patients (Figure 3).
A second request to EPIS-FWD in December 2013 was 
posed specifically to five countries that might have 
imported mussels, according the Dutch company’s 
website, in order to identify additional international 
related cases. None were reported by Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, or Switzerland. Previously (January and 
October 2013) none had been reported by France via 
HAVNET.
Discussion
This report describes a unique investigation of two 
closely related food-borne clusters of hepatitis A cases. 
Investigations following the traceback of the implicated 
mussels led to international matching of the nine pri-
mary and two secondary Dutch cases to three primary 
and two secondary cases in the UK with identical HAV 
sequences within the same time period. Consumption 
of a common source of mussels by Dutch cases and a 
UK case confirmed our findings. The investigation con-
vincingly points towards the case with a travel history 
to Central America being the source of the HAV clus-
ter, who then infected a subsequent household clus-
ter, all of whom lived close to the mussel production 
area. This unique multinational outbreak investigation 
demonstrates that a small number of patients in a non-
endemic area led to geographically dispersed HAV out-
breaks via food as a vehicle. Such a link would have 
gone unnoticed without sequence analyses and the 
combined forces of diverse institutes.
The number of patients in this investigation was small 
compared with other HAV outbreaks recently reported 
[5-8], which limited the available epidemiological data. 
Notably, the identification of the clusters was not 
based on an increase in the total number of patients, 
but was the result of the existing intensive surveil-
lance with molecular typing of HAV in patients in the 
Netherlands [3]. The rising numbers of reported food-
borne HAV outbreaks and RASFFs are likely to promote 
interest in diagnostic sample typing. This would assist 
source tracing in outbreak investigation and may result 
in an improved estimate of the impact of contaminated 
food on public health.
Bivalve molluscs (e.g. oysters and mussels) have long 
been associated with viral food-borne disease. Several 
large outbreaks associated with consumption of HAV 
contaminated bivalve molluscs have been described 
[14-16], often traced back to harvesting areas within 
endemic areas. HAV infections through consumption 
of bivalve molluscs may be anticipated with global 
trade from endemic to less endemic HAV areas [17]. 
The implicated bivalve molluscs in this report were 
however harvested from a non-endemic area with 
no prior indication of recent local HAV outbreaks, as 
occurred in 1997 although the 1997 outbreak had many 
more cases [18]. Generally, mussels from non-endemic 
areas are considered to be at low risk for HAV infection, 
especially as they are usually consumed after domestic 
heat treatment, like the Dutch cases described here. 
Domestic cooking procedures usually involve heating 
by steaming until the shells open, rather than immer-
sion for a defined period in boiling water. Internal tem-
peratures reached during steaming have been shown 
to be ineffective for complete inactivation of infectious 
HAV in mussels [19,20], but the outcome depends on 
initial contamination levels. The degree of cooking to 
reach an internal temperature of 90 °C for 90 seconds 
as required by EU legislation for commercial heat treat-
ment [21], which has been shown to reliably inactivate 
HAV [22], may however render bivalve molluscs unpal-
atable to consumers when applied in the domestic 
setting.
Area 2 is a source of mussels imported into the 
Netherlands, and mussels from this area have been 
previously tested for norovirus for microbiological 
assessment of bivalves on the Dutch market. The 
frequent occurrence of samples testing positive for 
norovirus indicates potential human faecal contami-
nation, which is consistent with its class B classifica-
tion (< 4,600 Escherichia coli per 100 g shellfish flesh in 
90% of samples) under EU food safety regulations. (EU 
Regulation number 854/2004). It is therefore feasible 
that sewage containing faeces from the sporadic cases 
of HAV patients may have entered the mussel growing 
water and led to contamination of parts of the mussel 
bed. It is interesting to reflect that over 1,000 tonnes of 
mussels were harvested from this area during the rel-
evant time period, the majority was exported to other 
European countries following processing and pack-
aging in the Netherlands, and yet only 10 associated 
HAV cases were identified. This could suggest a low, 
heterogeneous or temporary contamination, the risk of 
which may have been reduced through heat treatment. 
Otherwise, the low number of associated HAV cases 
could point towards low recovery from laboratory sur-
veillance, as sequence analyses of patient material is 
not common practice in most countries or is performed 
for some cases only [5,8] or is not systematically 
reported. In this study, it was only after more direct 
questioning regarding the residence of HAV cases and 
their proximity to mussel beds that samples taken from 
these particular cases were forwarded for sequencing. 
The occurrence of the two clusters, with the second 
cluster potentially associated with heavy rainfall, sug-
gests environmental factors played a part in increas-
ing the risk. The guidelines for the control of viruses in 
food [23] recommend that after heavy rainfall, and/or 
after overflow from sewage treatment plants, harvest-
ing of bivalve molluscs should cease for a period, until 
the water and/or bivalve mollusc quality in the harvest-
ing area has been assessed and has returned to nor-
mal background levels for the area. Similarly, official 
EU guidelines to Regulation 854/2004 require investi-
gation following a pollution or extreme weather event 
and, if necessary, additional controls to protect public 
health [24]. Area 2, like other similar areas affected 
by human faecal pollution, remains vulnerable to 
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sporadic HAV cases shedding virus within the drainage 
catchment area. Monitoring of shellfish or effluents of 
treated sewage for HAV contamination during periods 
of elevated risk, for example following identification 
of sporadic or outbreak cases within the catchment, 
could potentially assist public health protection. This 
would require real-time exchange of data on hepatitis 
A cases or virus detection between regional agencies 
dealing with public health, food safety and water qual-
ity, as even sporadic cases can shed a large amounts 
of virus over a period of time, and these viruses are 
only partially reduced by water treatment plants, and 
viruses in bivalve molluscs are bioaccumulated [1].
International sharing of HAV sequences proved help-
ful in this as well as in other recent outbreak inves-
tigations [4-8]. A database such as HAVNET (www.
havnet.nl) when used in real time may result in a 
rapid traceback of the product involved, followed by a 
recall, if still possible, or other preventive measures to 
increase food safety. Moreover, finding related cases 
in other countries could give an insight into the true 
size of food-borne outbreaks. Access to HAVNET can be 
requested by e-mailing havnet@rivm.nl.
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